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LENDERS' LIABILITY FOR AIDING AND
ABETTING RULE 10b-5 VIOLATIONS:
THE KNOWLEDGE STANDARD
by John H. Karnes, Jr.
NCREASING judicial concern for victimized investors' over the last
two decades has prompted courts to expand the original private cause of
action based upon rule lOb-5 2 to encompass secondary 3 parties.4 One
result of this expansion is that courts recognized liability for aiding and abet-
ting another party's violation of rule 10b-5. 5 Courts have distilled the ele-
1. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680-81 (N.D. Ind.
1966) (10b-5's purpose of protecting investors justifies the imposition of aider and abettor lia-
bility), affid, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); accord Myzel v.
Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 738 (8th Cir. 1967) (conspiracy liability), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968); Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 307 F.2d 242, 248-49 (6th Cir. 1962); SEC
v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 324 F. Supp. 189, 194-96 (N.D. Tex.) (aider and abettor
liability), affd, 448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971).
2. Securities Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. l0b-5 (1986), provides
that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstance under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
3. Courts draw a distinction between primary parties and peripheral, or secondary, par-
ties. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1314-16 (6th Cir. 1974). The primary party to a lOb-5
violation is that individual, or group of individuals, that actually perpetrates a fraud upon an
investor. Id. at 1314. A secondary party, on the other hand, does not actively participate in a
scheme to defraud an investor, but rather facilitates the primary party's activity. Id. The
distinction between primary and secondary parties is useful only in determining respective
standards of liability. Some federal criminal statutes punish secondary parties as principals or
primary parties. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1982) ("[w]hoever commits an offense against the United
States or aids, abets . . . or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal"). Under
federal securities law, primary and secondary parties are jointly and severally liable for any
judgment. SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904, 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Comment,
Rule Job-5 Liability After Hochfelder." Abandoning the Concept of Aiding and Abetting, 45 U.
CM. L. REV. 218, 219 (1977).
4. See generally Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases.- Aiding and
Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV.
597 (1972) (detailing the interaction between various extrastatutory causes of action and fed-
eral securities law).
5. See SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1312-13 (9th Cir. 1982); Woodward v.
Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 94-97 (5th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975); Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 680-81; 5 A. JACOBs, THE
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ments of their new rule lOb-5 aider and abettor liability into a three-pronged
test.6 The three-pronged test imposes liability if a primary party violates
rule lOb-5, if the alleged aider and abettor possesses some degree of aware-
ness of the primary party's violation, and if the alleged aider and abettor
lends substantial assistance to the violation. 7 This Comment suggests an ap-
propriate scienter requirement that courts should superimpose over the
three-pronged aider and abettor test in order to make the test more equita-
bly allocate secondary liability for another's rule lOb-5 violation. The analy-
sis places special emphasis on the particular problems that the current state
of aider and abettor liability creates for lenders.
Plaintiffs testing the limits of the aider and abettor doctrine are assailing
certain relationships with growing frequency.8 One such relationship is that
between a lender and borrower. Metge v. Baehler 9 illustrates the type of
factual setting ripe for accusations of aider and abettor liability against a
lender in connection with a fraud perpetrated by its borrower. In Metge a
bank extended a substantial loan to a borrower and consequently gained ac-
cess to comprehensive financial information concerning the borrower's busi-
ness operations. When the borrower encountered financial difficulties, the
bank pursued a series of banking strategies, including extending additional
loans to the borrower, in an effort to keep the borrower out of bankruptcy,
and therefore, salvage the bank's original loan. Throughout the entire time
the bank struggled to preserve the borrower, the borrower issued securities,
that, due to the borrower's precarious financial situation, may have been
worthless.
Upon the borrower's declaration of bankruptcy, the security holders sued
the bank, arguing that the bank, by virtue of its relationship with the bor-
rower, knew that the securities were worthless. The investors alleged that
the bank aided and abetted the borrower's rule lOb-5 violation by remaining
silent while continuing to fund the borrower's operation. As a result, the
investors alleged, the bank allowed the borrower to continue to issue worth-
less securities, the proceeds of which the borrower in turn used to repay the
borrower's debt to the bank. The facts in Metge demonstrate that banking
relationships, even if innocent, create a potential for accusations of aiding
IMPACT OF RULE lOb-5, § 40.02 (1980) (noting that courts are becoming increasingly recep-
tive to arguments proposing liability against those who assist defrauders); Ruder, supra note 4,
at 624.
6. For a complete discussion and critique of the three-prong test, see infra notes 64-131
and accompanying text.
7. Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 95-96 (5th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Coffey, 493
F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d
139, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
8. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 188 (1976) (suit against accounting firm);
Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985) (bank); SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020,
1023 (2d Cir. 1978) (attorney); Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 733 (10th Cir.
1974) (corporate officer); Excalibur Oil, Inc. v. Sullivan, 616 F. Supp. 458, 460 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
(attorney); Rich v. New York Stock Exch., 509 F. Supp. 87, 87-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (stock
exchange); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21, 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (stock ex-
change); H.L. Green Co. v. Childree, 185 F. Supp. 95, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (accountant).
9. 762 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1985).
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and abetting because lenders possess comprehensive knowledge of those enti-
ties with which they transact business and because, perhaps most impor-
tantly for plaintiffs, lenders have a dubious distinction as deep pockets.
The precise level of knowledge that courts require for imposing secondary
liability is the most crucial aspect of the three-pronged test applied to lenders
accused of aiding and abetting a rule l0b-5 violation. If courts establish an
unrealistically low level of requisite awareness, the lender who fails to dis-
close information concerning its borrower's conduct is confronted with the
awkward burden of proving a negative.
This Comment first outlines the evolution and current state of the aider
and abettor doctrine under federal securities laws in order to gain insight on
its justifications and its logical limits. The Comment next demonstrates that
the existing framework for imposing aider and abettor liability is ill-suited to
accommodate the tenuous lender-borrower relationship. This framework
consequently creates an unacceptably high risk that courts will impose liabil-
ity on lenders in inappropriate situations. The Comment further argues that
because the rule lOb-5 aider and abettor doctrine is founded on faulty rea-
soning and misconstruction of congressional intent, the doctrine itself is not
justified. Finally, this Comment urges courts to impose aider and abettor
liability on secondary parties such as lenders only upon the plaintiff's suc-
cessful proof that the lender actually knew of the primary party's fraud and
knowingly lent substantial assistance toward its commission.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF AIDER AND ABETTOR LIABILITY UNDER
SECTION 10(b)
In order to understand the basis for the rule lOb-5 doctrine of aider and
abettor liability, and hence the necessity for courts to provide additional
safeguards as they expand the doctrine to encompass more attenuated com-
mercial relationships, one must first understand how existing notions of rule
lOb-5 aider and abettor liability evolved. Through rule lOb-5 the SEC
makes unlawful the use of fraudulent practices in the purchase or sale of a
security.' 0 Although Congress intended only administrative remedies for
violation of section 10(b), I I the courts have subsequently implied a private
cause of action against primary perpetrators of a rule lOb-5 violation. All
circuits agree that primary parties to a fraud should be liable under rule lOb-
5.12
10. Securities Exchange Commission Rule l0b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1986).
11. United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979); SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186-87 (1963); H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2
(1934), reprinted in 2 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECUR-
ITIES ACT OF 1933 & THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 836-44 (1973); A. BROM-
BERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 2.2 (1979). See
generally Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent?, 57
Nw. U.L. REV. 627, 645 (1963) (author argues that Congress intended § lOb-5 to vest SEC
with added prosecutorial powers).
12. See, e.g., Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 768 F.2d 949, 957-59 (8th Cir. 1985) (private lOb-5
action is against defrauder), rev'd sub nom. Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 446 U.S. 112, 114 (1986)
(issue of primary party liability unaffected); Salcer v. Envicon Equities Corp., 744 F.2d 935,
1988]
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With respect to courts' imposition of liability on secondary parties, such
as lenders, however, the circuits are divided because in drafting the rule the
SEC neither specifically prescribed nor precluded courts' imposition of lia-
bility on remote parties. 3 Consequently, courts' willingness to impose lia-
bility on secondary parties varies from circuit to circuit 14 and from court to
court.' 5 A court's willingness to expand rule lOb-5 to cover secondary par-
ties is reflected in the quantum of knowledge that it requires the secondary
party to possess with regard to the second and third prongs of the three-
pronged test before the court will impose liability upon the party as an aider
and abettor. Courts disinclined to expand rule lOb-5 limit the application of
the aider and abettor doctrine by imposing liability upon only those secon-
dary parties who actually knew about' 6 or, in some cases, intended to fur-
ther 17 the underlying fraud. On the other hand, courts willing to expand the
rule impose liability on secondary parties who are merely reckless as to their
contribution to the underlying fraud.1
8
939 (2d Cir. 1984) (10b-5 proscribes fraud by issuer), judgm't vacated and remanded, 106 S.
Ct. 3324, 92 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1986); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1024 (5th Cir.) (party who
conducts fraud is liable under rule lOb-5), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 991 (1977).
13. Securities Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5, C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986); A. BROM-
BERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 11, § 2.2; L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION § 810
(1951).
Although Rule lOb-5 provides for liability when the primary party perpetrates a violation
indirectly, this is not secondary liability. Perpetrating an indirect rule lob-5 violation might
consist of using an unwilling instrumentality to consummate the fraud. A secondary party, on
the other hand, may not partake in the fraud, but rather may simply fail to intervene to stop it.
See Ruder, supra note 4, at 617 n.80 (arguing that congress used the term "indirect" to accom-
modate situations in which the defrauder accomplishes the fraud tacitly).
14. Compare Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.) (reckless
suffices under certain circumstances, such as when a fiduciary duty exists), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1039 (1978); Herm v. Strafford, 663 F.2d 669, 684-85 (6th Cir. 1981) (reckless supports
aider and abettor liability); SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1302 (9th Cir. 1982) (ap-
proving lob-5 liability for one who recklessly aids and abets); with Woodward v. Metro Bank,
522 F.2d 84, 95-96 (5th Cir. 1975) (danger of over inclusiveness mandates courts to require
actual knowledge); Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir. 1979) (aider
and abettor liability requires knowing assistance); see also Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625
n.1 (8th Cir. 1985) (withholding judgment on the issue).
15. Compare Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.) (recklessness
suffices), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978), with Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clear-
ance Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 484-85 (2d Cir. 1979) ("[W]e held that 'recklessness' may be an
appropriate standard for scienter when there is a fiduciary duty, but we have gone no fur-
ther. . . .Finding a person liable for aiding and abetting a violation of lOb-5 ... requires
something closer to an actual intent to aid in a fraud .... ). Compare McLean v. Alexander,
599 F.2d 1190, 1197 (3d Cir. 1970) (scienter defined as recklessness) with Monsen v. Consol.
Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir. 1978) (aider and abettor must have knowledge of
wrong and knowingly assist it), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978). Compare Stokes v. Lokken,
644 F.2d 779, 783 (8th Cir. 1981) (aider-abettor need only be reckless) with Berdahl v. SEC,
572 F.2d 643, 647 (8th Cir. 1978) (knowledge is required for aider-abettor liability).
16. Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 95 (5th Cir. 1975) (to prevent liberal expan-
sion of aider and abettor liability only the knowing aider and abettor is liable); accord Landy v.
FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 162 (3d Cir. 1973) (expressing a desire to limit the application of aiding
and abetting liability by requiring knowing conduct), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
17. Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d at 96 (if the defendant is accused of aiding and
abetting through silence or inaction, then proof of actual intent to aid and abet is necessary).




Courts began integrating the aider and abettor doctrine into federal secur-
ities law in enforcement proceedings to enjoin the acts of secondary parties
knowingly assisting in another's perpetration of a securities fraud. 19 The
SEC first used the doctrine of aider and abettor liability to enjoin the opera-
tions of security salesmen who were facilitating a dealer's illegal distribution
of stock. 20 In these early decisions the courts analogized to general notions
of aiding and abetting under criminal law as support for their holdings. 21
Wielding criminal law concepts, one court enjoined the acts of defendants
who did not actually commit a violation of rule lOb-5, but who, according to
the court, knew of its existence, participated in it, and desired its success. 22
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co. 23 provided the catalyst
for the courts' development of the modern doctrine of aider and abettor lia-
bility under rule lOb-5 in civil contexts. The defendant in Brennan, Mid-
western United Life Insurance Company, discovered that a securities dealer
who traded heavily in the corporation's stock was shorting its investors'
Midwestern stock. On several occasions Midwestern threatened to inform
the state securities board of the dealer's exploits. Midwestern abruptly
changed its attitude, however, when it realized such a scandal might endan-
ger pending merger negotiations by reducing the abnormally high price of
Midwestern stock. Consequently, not only did Midwestern fail to report the
dealer as it threatened, but it also persuaded its dissatisfied shareholders to
direct their complaints to the dealer himself, rather than to the state securi-
ties board. As a result of Midwestern's actions, the dealer was able to iden-
tify those investors that were most likely to complain to the authorities. This
knowledge allowed the dealer to perpetuate his scheme by actually purchas-
ing just enough stock to appease disgruntled investors while embezzling the
funds of those investors that never grew suspicious about the dealer's nonde-
livery. As a result, none of the investors complained to the state securities
board. By the time the authorities uncovered the dealer's scheme, the dealer
had absconded with the investments of many of Midwestern's shareholders.
In denying Midwestern's motion to dismiss the investors' lOb-5 claim
against it, the Brennan court held that the investors had stated a cause of
action against Midwestern as an aider and abettor of the dealer's fraudulent
scheme. 24 In so doing, however, the court acknowledged that the holding
was supported neither by the explicit terms of section 10(b) of the Act nor by
19. See SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968) (action to enjoin attorney from distrib-
uting misleading information concerning client corporation); Timetrust, Inc. v. SEC, 142 F.2d
744 (9th Cir. 1944) (first aider and abettor action to enjoin corporations from selling bank
stock pursuant to a fraudulent installment plan).
20. Timetrust, 142 F.2d at 747.
21. Id. at 746 (court analogized to criminal aiding and abetting to enjoin actions of secon-
dary parties); accord In re Burley & Co., 23 S.E.C. 461, 468 n.ll (1946) (aider and abettor
condemnation by criminal law also creates a violation of rule lOb-5 because "anyone who aids
and abets another's violation of a law has himself violated that law").
22. Timetrust, 142 F.2d at 748.
23. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), affd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 989 (1970).
24. See id. at 675-83.
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the legislative intent behind the statute.25
Instead, the court characterized its imposition of secondary liability upon
Midwestern as a logical extension from the private cause of action that
courts previously implied under rule lOb-5. 26 Rule lOb-5, according to the
court, serves merely as a mechanism for the court's expansion of federal
common law remedies. 2 7 The court reasoned that because federal common
law implies a remedy from the violation of a right, the perpetration of a
fraud that rule lOb-5 proscribes warrants a remedy. 28 Although subsequent
decisions cited Brennan as a precedent for much broader liability, 29 the
court arguably limited its holding to the situation in which a fiduciary secon-
dary party benefits from the primary party's fraud while knowingly and af-
firmatively aiding and abetting the fraud's perpetration. 30 The Brennan
court's holding assumed that Midwestern benefited from its tacit agreement
with the dealer by avoiding a scandal that might have compromised pending
merger negotiations.3 ' The court further found that in so doing Midwestern
knowingly assisted the dealer's perpetration of a fraud against the corpora-
tion's shareholders. 3
2
The Brennan opinion is particularly noteworthy today because the court
identified section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts33 as the basis for
extending liability to parties peripheral to the fraud. Section 876 imposes
secondary liability for personal injury against any person who is aware that
the tortfeasor is breaching a duty to the victim and who offers substantial
assistance in the tortfeasor's infliction of the injury.34 The Brennan analogy
to secondary liabilities under tort law currently provides the primary justifi-
25. Id. at 680 ("[O]ne can search the statute in vain for language indicating that a violator
of Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 should be liable in a civil action for damages. Such liability
was developed by the courts on general principles of tort law.").
26. Id. at 679-80.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 921-22 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Brennan for imposing
liability for merely knowing of fraud and failing to warn victim); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dil-
lon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.) (citing Brennan for imposition of liability when no cogni-
zable benefit accrued to aider and abettor), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
30. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 681-82 (N.D. Ind.
1966), afl'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1976); accord Ruder,
supra note 4, at 623.
31. 259 F. Supp. at 675.
32. Id.; see Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (Brennan court imposed
aider-abettor liability on a finding of actual knowledge plus affirmative inquiries from those to
whom the defendant owed a fiduciary duty), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1977) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
(SECOND)].
34. 259 F. Supp. at 680. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 33, § 876 states:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another,
one is subject to liability if he
(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or pursuant to a common
design with him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious re-




cation for aider and abettor liability in securities actions. 35
In SEC v. Coffey 3 6 the Sixth Circuit expanded the rule in Brennan by
formulating the first of several existing three-pronged tests for determining
aider and abettor liability under rule lOb-5. According to Coffey a secon-
dary party may be deemed liable as an aider and abettor if the primary party
violates rule lOb-5, if the secondary party has a general awareness of the
violation, and if the secondary party knowingly lends substantial assistance
to the execution of the wrong.37 The Coffey test fails to incorporate the
additional requirements of fiduciary duty, benefit, and actual knowledge of
the fraud upon which the Brennan court implicitly based its decision. 38
Woodward v. Metro Bank 39 was the first major case to recognize the need
to restrict the aider and abettor doctrine in order to accommodate the com-
peting investor and business interests that arise in a commercial context.
The Woodward court asserted that courts exceeded congressional intent by
creating secondary liability under rule lOb-5. 40 Although the court em-
braced the aider and abettor doctrine in theory,4' it warned other courts
against expanding the doctrine to impose liability based on the attenuated
relationships that develop in commercial transactions. 42 The courts' contin-
ued expansion of the aider and abettor doctrine would, according to the
Woodward court, ultimately interfere with vital areas of commercial law.43
In order to curtail the expansion of the aider and abettor doctrine, the
Woodward court adopted the Coffey test with two significant modifica-
tions.44 First, in addition to requiring the plaintiff to prove the primary
35. SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1310 (9th Cir. 1982) (tort law supports the
recognition of rule lOb-5 aider and abettor liability); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84,
91 (5th Cir. 1975) (rule lOb-5 aider and abettor liability is founded on tort); Brennan v. Mid-
western United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D. Ind. 1966), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 11,
§ 8.5.
36. 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
37. 493 F.2d at 1316.
38. See IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980) (imposing liability for merely know-
ing of fraud and failing to warn victim); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44
(2d Cir.) (imposing liability when no cognizable benefit accrued to aider and abettor), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 90-91 (5th Cir. 1975)
(imposing liability without finding benefit to the aider and abettor); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d
1304, 1316 n.29 (6th Cir. 1974) (citing Brennan for adoption of § 876 of RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) without requiring intent to aid or receipt of benefit), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975);
Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (no mention of benefit to aider and abettor),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
39. 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975).
40. Id. at 99 n.33. The Woodward court stated: "Actually, Congress and the Commission
probably never intended that the rule be extended as far as it has been." Id. (citing Ruder,
supra note 5, at 627).
41. Id. at 99. After discussing the paucity of legislative history for rule lOb-5, the Wood-
ward court noted: "We neither desire nor would we be able to cut back on the established
scope of lOb-5. However, we can refuse to create a new, sweeping expansion of the Rule which
will pre-empt significant areas of commercial law." Id. at 99 n.33.
42. Id. at 98-99.
43. Id. at 99 n.33.
44. Id. at 94-95. The Woodward test for aiding and abetting may be summarized as:
(1) an underlying rule lOb-5 violation; (2) an awareness that one's role in the activity was
wrongful; and (3) knowing, substantial assistance.
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party's rule lOb-5 violation, the Woodward test also requires proof of the
accused aider and abettor's knowledge of its role in the wrongful activity.45
Second, the Woodward test requires the plaintiff to prove that the accused
aider and abettor knowingly assisted in the primary party's perpetration of
the violation. 46
II. LENDERS UNDER THE EXISTING FRAMEWORK:
A SQUARE PEG IN A ROUND HOLE
The aider and abettor doctrine as currently formulated in variations on
the three-pronged test provides an inadequate method for evaluating secon-
dary rule lOb-5 liabilities that may arise from lender and borrower relation-
ships. First, courts founded the rule lOb-5 aider and abettor doctrine upon
criminal4 7 and tort law48 notions of secondary liability that are factually and
theoretically inconsistent with federal securities law. Furthermore, none of
the test's existing prongs fairly allocate liability in attenuated relationships.
This section critically examines the propriety of using either tort or criminal
law to justify rule lOb-5 aider and abettor liability and then analyzes the
inadequacies of the current aider and abettor three-pronged framework as
courts apply it to lenders.
A. The Basis of the Aider and Abettor Liability Doctrine
Courts have used both criminal and tort doctrines of aider and abettor
liability to justify their imposition of civil aider and abettor liability based
upon a violation of rule lOb-5. One commentator argues, however, that
compared to securities law violations, the wrongs that courts designed crimi-
nal aider and abettor law to accommodate are analytically much simpler
than those arising under rule 10b-5. As opposed to rule 10b-5 cases, crimi-
nal laws are best suited for resolving basic physical issues such as one's pres-
ence and conduct rather than one's state of mind. 49
More important than the analytical differences existing between conven-
tional criminal and rule lOb-5 fact patterns is the fact that the criminal pro-
visions that fostered the rule lOb-5 doctrine of aider and abettor liability
offered a degree of protection from conviction based upon mere unfortunate
coincidence that courts failed to adopt into the modern lOb-5 aider and abet-
tor doctrine. For example, to convict an individual for criminally aiding and
abetting the commission of an offense, the state must generally prove that
the secondary party intended to aid the primary perpetrator in committing a
crime.50 Regardless of any other reasons motivating courts to require proof
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
48. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
49. See Comment, supra note 3, at 242 (arguing that as opposed to criminal law "in the
context of modern securities fraud cases, involving intricate schemes in which the actions of
several persons are essential to success, the concept of aiding and abetting seems quite artifi-
cial, and its utility and purpose less than obvious").
50. In United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938), Justice Learned Hand
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of actual intent, such a rigorous standard of mens rea reduces the risk that
the judicial system will impose guilt on an innocent bystander. 51 Further-
more, the criminal aider and abettor doctrine mitigates the risk of a jury's
wrongful imposition of guilt, which is present whenever courts assess the
culpability of a secondary party, by punishing the aider and abettor much
less severely than the primary perpetrator. 52 The rule lOb-5 aider and abet-
tor doctrine on the other hand, imposes liability on a showing much less
rigorous than intent,53 and such liability is joint and several with the pri-
mary party. 54 In creating the rule lOb-5 aider and abettor doctrine, there-
fore, courts have excerpted the principles of vicarious liability contained in
the criminal law doctrine while ignoring the safeguards inherent in the crim-
inal system.
Tort concepts, like criminal law concepts, also serve as poor bases upon
which to found a federal securities law theory of secondary liability. Tort
law contains no explicit aider and abettor concepts.55 The tort concepts that
held that a defendant aids and abets a crime when "he in some [way] associate[s] himself with
the venture, . . . participate[s] in it as in something that he wishes to bring about .... [and]
seek[s] by his action to make it succeed." The Supreme Court adopted Justice Hand's rendi-
tion in Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949). See also MODEL PENAL
CODE § 242.2 (Official Draft 1962) ("A person commits an offense if he purposely aids another
to accomplish an unlawful object of a crime"); accord Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 163-64
(3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); United States v. Austin, 462 F.2d 724, 732
(10th Cir. 1972); Grimes v. United States, 379 F.2d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 1967).
51. Courts are beginning to realize the unfairness that the lack of corresponding proce-
dural protections creates in any aiding and abetting action under federal securities law. In
Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d 168, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1980), the court confronted the
knowledge requirement and posited:
The awareness of wrong-doing requirement for aiding and abetting liability is
designed to insure that innocent, incidental participants in transactions later
found to be illegal are not subjected to harsh, civil, criminal, or administrative
penalties. This policy is especially germane where the proscribed conduct of the
principal may not always appear to be wrongful ....
Accord SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1317 (6th Cir. 1974) (rigorous knowledge requirement
prevents participants from dragging innocent parties into a suit), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908
(1975).
52. Although aiders and abettors are punished as principals under 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1983),
important criminal law authorities suggest that the criminal law system should punish the
secondary party less severely. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 242.4 (Official Draft 1962) (aiding
consumption of a crime "is a felony of the third degree if the principal offense was a felony of
the first or second degree. Otherwise it is a misdemeanor.").
53. Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 782 (8th Cir. 1981) (aider and abettor liability may be
imposed for recklessness); see also Comment, supra note 3, at 234-35 (discussing the difference
between standards of intent, knowledge, and recklessness in securities law).
54. Mendelsohn v. Capital Underwriters, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1069, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 1979);
Gilmore & McBride, Liability of Financial Institutions for Aiding and Abetting Violations of
Securities Laws, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 811, 827 (1985).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 33, § 876 deals with contributory tortfeasors
who may or may not be aiders and abettors. The comments to § 876 focus on the contributing
tortfeasor's assistance, presence at the scene of the tort, the parties' relationship, and the
tortfeasor's state of mind. The reference to the commission of a tort and the emphasis on
presence in general, demonstrates that the section's drafters did not intend it to resolve the
complex, fluid violations that arise under securities law.
One commentator argues that the principles expounded in § 876 apply only to the alloca-
tion of liability for distinct physical harms and not more tenuous economic harms. Gilmore &
McBride, supra note 54, at 833.
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various courts cite as the basis for rule lOb-5 aider and abettor liability 56
merely describe interrelationships sufficient to justify imposition of liability
on both parties involved. 57 Further, the policies that courts intended to pro-
mote by synthesizing common law tort doctrine are subtly, yet undeniably,
different from those that Congress intended to further in promulgating the
Act.58 Moreover, the fissure between these two policies widens as the partic-
ular fact situation at issue deviates from the typical fact pattern that tort
policies contemplate toward the more complex situations in which Congress
has seen fit to apply federal securities policy. As a potential aiding and abet-
ting situation becomes complicated by securities and commercial transac-
tions, tort policies and the policies underlying the Act are likely to create
inconsistent outcomes. 59
B. The Modern Aider and Abettor Action
The Woodward court noted that the rule lOb-5 aider and abettor doctrine
is still undefined, and consequently the standard of liability varies from juris-
diction to jurisdiction.60 Although most jurisdictions confronting the issue
56. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
57. The tort analog to aiding and abetting is the area of concerted wrongful action. This
doctrine assures that all who act wrongfully in concert, through their presence, assistance, and
participation, will bear the liability equally. The cases really deal with instances in which the
tortfeasors of equal culpability unite to cause harm rather than those in which a party merely
aids the primary tortfeasor. See Thompson v. Johnson, 180 F.2d 431, 433-34 (5th Cir. 1950).
58. Commentators suggest that "[t]he primary purpose of tort law is that of compensating
plaintiffs for the injuries they have suffered wrongfully at the hands of others." 1 S. SPEISER, C.
KRAUSE & A. GANS, LAW OF TORTS § 1:3 (1983) (quoting Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404
A.2d 8, 11 (1979)); accord W. SEAVEY, P. KEETON & R. KEETON, LAW OF TORTS 1 (2d ed.
1964).
Very little legislative history exists evidencing Congress's precise purposes for enacting the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982). The protection of investors
was indisputably one of Congress's ultimate objectives. See supra note I and accompanying
text. Identifying Congress's ultimate objective for promulgating the Act does not illuminate
the extent to which Congress contemplated interfering with commercial transactions in order
to attain its goal. The Acts' legislative history suggests that Congress did not intend to protect
investors in disregard of the corresponding cost to business, but rather that Congress intended
a balancing between the twin goals of investor protection and relief of the burden on business:
"The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public and honest business .... " S. REP.
No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) (emphasis added), quoted in United States v. Naftalin, 441
U.S. 768, 775 (1979). "Just as important [as the protection of investors] is the tragic effect
upon industrial enterprises and the workers who have invested their lives and their labor in
[their businesses]". 77 CONG. REC. 2925 (daily ed. May 5, 1933) (statement of Rep. Kelly).
Relying on much of this legislative history, the Supreme Court recently stated that "neither
this Court nor Congress has ever suggested that investor protection was the sole purpose of the
Securities Act." United States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979) (emphasis in original).
59. Tort policy and securities law policy generally diverge as transactions become less
securities transactions and more commercial transactions. The Woodward court stated:
Many areas of business activity are governed by state laws, such as the Uniform
Commercial Code, or other federal laws, such as the Truth-in-Lending Act ....
Some transactions, it is only logical to assume, should be left to the operation of
these other laws, for Rule lOb-5 was not designed to be the ethical Ten Com-
mandments for all securities transactions.
522 F.2d at 91. Further, "protection of investors is of primary importance, but it must be kept
in mind that the nation's welfare depends on . . . a reliable, vigorous business community."
Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 804-05 (5th Cir. 1969).
60. 522 F.2d at 94.
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have adopted some form of three-pronged test for liability, no uniform stan-
dard of conduct or specified degree of intent or knowledge exists. 61 These
various existing tests for aider and abettor liability are generally formulated
in terms of awareness, knowledge, and substantial assistance. 62 Accord-
ingly, the degree of conscious participation, intent, and specific conduct that
courts require remains open to arguments based on public policy and the
purpose of federal securities law. 63 The post-Brennan cases demonstrate
that the three-pronged test fails to facilitate the courts' accurate and equita-
ble determination of liability in the context of the relationships between
lender and borrower.
1. The First Prong. Existence of an Underlying Violation
The independent securities law violation requirement is the only stable
prong of the three-pronged test. Courts agree that a primary party's in-
dependent violation of rule lOb-5 is a prerequisite to a secondary party's
aider and abettor liability.64 The underlying violation requirement focuses
solely on the primary wrongdoer's conduct and avoids any inquiry into the
lender's activities or relationship to the primary party.65 Because the in-
dependent violation requirement is completely objective and independent of
the accused aider and abettor's relationship to the perpetrator, the require-
ment avoids the possibility that a fact finder might infer the lender's partici-
pation in its borrower's fraud by virtue of the lender's familarity with the
borrower. As a result, the primary violation prong does not pose any spe-
cific risks to commercial finance.
2. The Second Prong: Awareness of the Underlying Violation
In contrast, the awareness requirement is particularly ill-suited for resolv-
ing aiding and abetting accusations against remote secondary parties such as
lending institutions. The circuits disagree both on the quantum 66 of knowl-
edge, and the object 67 of the knowledge, that a secondary party must possess
61. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 44.
63. See Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d at 97. See generally Note, Liability for Aiding
and Abetting Violations ofRule lOb-5: Recklessness Standard in Civil Damage Actions, 62 TEX.
L. REV. 1087 (1985) (arguing that courts would best serve the policies underlying securities
law if they resolved the existing controversy by adopting a recklessness standard).
64. Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 783 (8th Cir. 1981); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522
F.2d at 97.
65. Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d at 94 (both the Woodward and Coffey tests in-
quire whether "some other party has committed a securities law violation").
66. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
67. Compare Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1973) (test is functionally
similar to Gross v. SEC) with Gross v. SEC, 418 F.2d 103, 107 (2d Cir. 1968) (aiding and
abetting requires only awareness of underlying violation) and Cleary v. Perfectune, 700 F.2d
774, 777 (3d Cir. 1983) (knowledge requirement applies to the assistance requirement), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978) with Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 554 (10th Cir. 1974) (aiding
and abetting requires awareness that assistance will aid fraud). In contrast some courts apply
an even more comprehensive standard. See Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d at 94-95




concerning the defrauder's scheme before a court classifies the secondary
party as an aider and abettor.68 Thus, depending on the circuit in which the
plaintiff brings its action, the court may require the plaintiff to provide evi-
dence either of the alleged aider and abettor's awareness of the underlying
violation, 69 or the degree to which the secondary party knowingly assisted
that violation,7 0 or both. 7 1 The circuits also vary on the quantum of knowl-
edge that the plaintiff must show the secondary party possessed.7 2 Conse-
quently, any lender that is subject to the jurisdiction of more than one circuit
appears potentially vulnerable to aider and abettor liability for varying de-
grees of awareness about several differing types of conduct. Such conditions
make it difficult for an enterprise to chart its conduct so as to avoid liability.
Classifications based on the quantum and the object of the secondary
party's knowledge under the three-pronged test exalt form over substance.
Such classifications, therefore, transgress the Act's goal of evaluating the
economic reality of transactions. 73 Those circuits that impose liability upon
secondary parties that knowingly aided and abetted a rule lOb-5 violation,
but that, at the same time, had less than actual knowledge of the violation's
existence, best illustrate the inequity of the analysis. 74 The existing aware-
ness analysis causes courts to allocate liability based upon rite rather than
reality. After all, one can possess actual knowledge of another's rule lOb-5
violation and recklessly aid and abet its commission. Logic dictates, how-
ever, that one cannot have less than specific knowledge of a violation's exist-
ence and still knowingly assist it. An aider and abettor's awareness of the
underlying securities law violation is indispensable to its awareness of its
function in the violation, and the quantum of knowledge that courts require
of the latter cannot, therefore, logically exceed the former.
Courts now recognize scienter as an element of a primary rule lOb-5 viola-
tion. 75 Consequently, a secondary party cannot aid and abet a fraud by neg-
ligently failing to uncover it. 7 6 Thus, a bystander that could discover the
68. See generally Gilmore & McBride, supra note 54, at 828-29 (1985) (elucidating on the
distinction between extent of awareness and object of awareness); Comment, supra note 3, at
236-38 (discussing the appropriate knowledge requirement applicable to the second and third
prongs of the aider and abettor test).
69. Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1973).
70. Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 554 (10th Cir. 1974).
71. Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d at 94-95.
72. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 697 (1985) (both Howey
and Forman require courts to ignore formalities and determine a situation's economic reality);
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975) (reaffirming Techerepin
v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967)); SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293, 300-01 (1946) (eco-
nomic reality of scheme raised tied sale of orange groves and service program to an investment
contract).
74. See Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973); Gross v. SEC, 418 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.
1968).
75. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976); see generally Comment, Rule
lOb-5 Liability for Aiding and Abetting After Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 28 U. FLA. L. REV.
999, 1003-04 (1976) (explaining the effect of the scienter requirement on rule lOb-5).
76. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 193; IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 923 (2d
Cir. 1980) (recklessness satisfies scienter, negligence does not); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304,
1316 n.30 (6th Cir. 1974) (scienter requires higher mental state than negligence), cert. denied,
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primary party's fraud using due care would not be liable as an aider and
abettor.
Except for the elimination of negligence as a possible standard for impos-
ing aider and abettor liability, the courts' adoption of scienter in rule lOb-5
cases provides courts with little practical aid in assessing whether a lender's
extent of awareness of its borrower's fraudulent acts warrants imposing aider
and abettor liability on the lender under the knowledge prong of the aider
and abettor test. Although scienter constitutes an element of a primary
party's rule lOb-5 violation, 77 and although courts refer to a secondary
party's knowledge as scienter, 78 it is not clear whether the scienter standard
is the same for both the primary and secondary violator.79 What is more,
the circuits are divided over the precise mental states that satisfy the scienter
requirement; some circuits require knowledge, 80 some require only reckless-
ness, 8 1 and some hold that the quantum should vary for secondary
liability. 82
If recklessness constitutes scienter for a primary violation of the rule, and
most courts indicate that it does,'8 then recklessness could conceivably also
serve as the requisite quantum of knowledge needed to impose liability upon
an aider and abettor. Several courts have indicated, however, that scienter
for the secondary party should be set higher than for the primary party.8 4 If,
on the other hand, courts ultimately determine that a primary violation of
rule lOb-5 requires actual knowledge, then both fairness and common sense
dictate that courts impose corresponding aider and abettor liability on no
less than a similar finding. Notably, the culpable quantum of knowledge in
criminal law, which fostered the doctrine of aider and abettor liability under
420 U.S. 908 (1975); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973) (scienter
contemplates at least recklessness); Comment, supra note 3, at 236-38.
77. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 191.
78. See Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d at 95.
79. See id. Courts must "scale up" the scienter they require for secondary liability as a
party's actions become more remote from the actual violation. The Woodward court held that
"the surrounding circumstances and expectations of the parties are critical" in determining the
proper level of scienter, thus intimating that the standard varies from situation to situation. Id.
But see Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 783 (8th Cir. 1981) (scienter is the same for both
primary and secondary parties).
80. Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 638 (8th Cir. 1985); Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669,
684-85 (6th Cir. 1981); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d at 95-96.
81. SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1312 (9th Cir. 1982); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman
Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1978).
82. See Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d at 782-84 (knowledge prong refers to Hochfelder's
scienter, and is the same as is required for a primary violation; knowing assistance prong,
however, requires actual knowledge).
83. Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337-38 (9th Cir. 1978); First Virginia Bankshares
v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1977); Sundstrand
Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
But see Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 378 n.4 (1983) (explicitly leaving
open the question of whether recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement); Cook v. Avien,
Inc., 573 F.2d 685, 692 (1st Cir. 1978) (explicitly stating that the First Circuit has not decided
whether recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement).
84. See Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d at 95-97 (as activity becomes more remote,
scienter requirement increases; when activity is ordinary commercial transaction, something
approaching intent is required); lIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 923-24 (2d Cir. 1980).
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rule lOb-5, is not mere knowledge, but rather intent to aid in the consumma-
tion of the offense. Presumably, the high criminal law standard defers to the
fact that as physical presence decreases, forcing courts to rely on more cir-
cumstantial evidence to convict, the risk of mistaken judgments increases.8 5
The knowledge prong of the aider and abettor test particularly disadvan-
tages lenders since the extent of the lender's awareness of its role in a securi-
ties law violation and hence its liability as a potential aider and abettor, is a
question of fact86 for the discretion of a jury. As a result, the knowledge
requirement discriminates heavily against lenders, most of whom are banks,
because banks appear as unsympathetic defendants to jurors. The awareness
requirement allows plaintiffs to establish a doubt in the minds of the jury
regarding a lender's participation in its borrower's fraud simply by showing
that the lender was very familiar with the borrower's finances. In such a
case the lender has the unenviable task of arguing that, in order to prosper, it
must make and administer loans at a minimum of expense. Unfortunately,
loan approval procedures allow banks to scrutinize only their borrowers' sol-
vency, credit history, and motives for obtaining the loan. That a bank may
well possess sufficient information about its borrower's operations to deter-
mine whether they have violated rule lOb-5 is axiomatic. Courts must rec-
ognize, however, that banks do not review their borrowers' finances with an
eye toward fraud, but rather with an eye toward financial stability.87
3. The Substantial Assistance Requirement
An analysis of the substantial assistance requirement illustrates the two
major shortcomings of the current aider and abettor test as it applies to lend-
ers. First, the substantial assistance requirement forces courts to draw a du-
bious distinction between assistance through action and assistance through
inaction.88 A survey of the cases indicates that although drawing such a
distinction is often impossible, the results of a court's classifying a secondary
party's conduct as either action or inaction is generally outcome determina-
tive. Second, notwithstanding the arbitrariness of the distinction between ac-
tion and inaction, the typical plaintiff basis its aider and abettor action
against a lender on the lender's silence or inaction. 89 Under existing aider
85. See Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 163-64 (3d Cir. 1973) (suggesting that evidence of
aiding and abetting will necessarily be circumstantial, and that the inferences raised by silence
may tend to implicate innocent bystanders).
86. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1283 (2d Cir. 1969) (intent to
defraud is a fact issue); see Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 682
(N.D. Ind. 1966) (alleged aider and abettor's knowledge and assistance are jury questions),
affid, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
87. But see Gilmore & McBride, supra note 54, at 841 (banks only have access to informa-
tion that their borrowers supply; although a borrower's fraud may not be obvious, banks
should be conscious of fraud upon reviewing borrower's files).
88. See infra notes 91-114 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1006-07 (11th Cir. 1985) (bank
failed to fully explain its relationship with the primary parties); Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d
621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985) (bank accused of nondisclosure of borrower's fraud); Woodward v.




and abettor principles, however, mere silence does not satisfy the require-
ment of substantial assistance.90 Consequently, if courts use existing aider
and abettor principles to adjudicate claims against lenders, they will have to
expand the already over-extended rule lOb-5 to cover nonfeasance as a mat-
ter of course.
a. The Action/Inaction Dilemma
The most unworkable component of the current rule lOb-5 aider and abet-
tor doctrine is the distinction that the doctrine requires courts to draw be-
tween assisting a violation with action and assisting it with inaction. As a
rule, courts hold that inaction cannot constitute aiding and abetting absent a
duty to act or specific intent to aid and abet the fraud.91 If, on the other
hand, a court characterizes a secondary party's assistance as action, then it
may not only impose aider and abettor liability on the party, but in some
jurisdictions it may do so upon a finding of mere recklessness. 92 In reality, a
court's classification of a secondary party's conduct as either action or inac-
tion is often dispositive of the secondary party's liability. 93 The most nag-
ging inadequacy of the current aider and abettor doctrine, therefore, is that
despite the crucial nature of a secondary party's role in a fraud to the issue of
the party's liability as an aider and abettor, no clear distinction exists be-
tween active and passive assistance. 94
The recent decision in Metge v. Baehler95 demonstrates the importance of
whether a court classifies a lender's conduct as action or inaction. In Metge
the defendant bank financed its borrower's purchase of a subsidiary. At the
90. Rudolph v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 800 F.2d 1040, 1043 (11 th Cir. 1986); Cleary v.
Perfectune, 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d at 94-95;
SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1310 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975); Strong
v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1973); Wright v. Schock, 571 F. Supp. 642, 663 (N.D.
Cal. 1983); Ruder, supra note 4, at 645.
Commenting on the relationship between the scienter requirement and the substantial
assistance requirement, one court offered the following caveat:
[A]pplication of the tripartite test should not obscure the basic proposition that
mere bystanders, even if aware of the fraud, cannot be held liable for inaction
since they do not, in Judge Hand's words, associate themselves with the venture
or participate in it as something they wish to bring about.
liT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 927 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added).
91. Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985) (scienter when inaction is in-
volved is high standard of intent); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d at 95 (when defendant
is accused of aiding through silence, plaintiff must prove that defendant possessed a high stan-
dard of intent); Mendlesohn v. Capital Underwriters, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1069, 1084 (N.D. Cal.
1979) ("[w]ithout evidence that [defendant] did some affirmative act tending to cover up the
fraud, this Court would hesitate to find substantial encouragement based on evidence of equiv-
ocal acts accompanied by mere allegations of undisclosed psychic support").
92. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
94. Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985) (bank inactive despite perpetua-
tion of the defrauder's existence by a series of banking strategies); Strong v. France, 474 F.2d
747, 751 (9th Cir. 1973) (though promoter of corporation signed a letter containing misrepre-
sentations and joined the board of an inchoate corporation, his conduct was inactive); Feldman
v. Simkins Indus., Inc., 492 F. Supp. 839, 847 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (stockbroker selling stock for
defrauder was not action); accord Comment, Supra note 3, at 241 n.165.
95. 762 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1985).
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outset the bank discovered that the borrower had a severe cash flow prob-
lem, but that the borrower was nonetheless issuing mortgage-backed securi-
ties to the public. Over time the borrower's financial condition deteriorated,
and the bank protected its interest by taking an active role in the borrower's
finances. Eventually, the bank was receiving quarterly financial statements
from the borrower and arranging loan strategies to perpetuate the bor-
rower's operations. Given the information contained in the borrower's fi-
nancial statements, the bank arguably could have discerned that the
securities that the borrower was issuing were worthless. When the borrower
finally went bankrupt, the holders of the worthless securities brought suit
against the bank, arguing that the bank aided and abetted the borrower's
fraud by failing to disclose that the securities were worthless and by perpetu-
ating its borrower's existence through loans.
At trial the investors produced evidence indicating that the borrower
might have used at least some part of the offering proceeds to repay its loan
to the bank. Further, as the borrower's condition worsened the bank did in
fact make additional loans to the borrower to help it maintain its debt and
avoid default. As a result, the evidence might have supported the inference
that the bank sheltered the borrower from bankruptcy so that the borrower
could continue to issue its securities to fund its repayment of its debt to the
bank. 96
Since the borrower in Metge assumedly violated rule lOb-5 by issuing
worthless securities, and since the bank's loans enabled the borrower to con-
tinue issuing the securities, the bank's liability depended to a large extent
upon the degree of the bank's awareness of its borrower's fraud. The Metge
court ultimately classified the bank's role in its borrower's fraud as inac-
tion.97 Consequently, because courts refuse to impose aider and abettor lia-
bility on inactive secondary parties absent proof that they actually intended
to further the fraud, the investors could only recover from the bank under
the aider and abettor doctrine upon their showing that the bank harbored a
high degree of conscious intent to aid its borrower's fraud. 98
The Metge court's finding that the bank was guilty of mere inaction was
pivotal because, had the court classified the bank's role as action, which the
facts arguably supported, and had the court been located in a jurisdiction
subscribing to the recklessness standard, the investors would have had the
much less onerous burden of proving only that the bank acted recklessly. 99
Inasmuch as the bank knew that it was keeping its borrower out of insol-
vency and that the bank therefore knew that the borrower was issuing secur-
ities while bordering on bankruptcy, the bank arguably acted recklessly in
financing the borrower's fraud. On the other hand, the investor's evidence
against the bank obviously fell short of proving the bank's conscious intent
96. Id. at 629.
97. Id. at 624.
98. Id. at 625.
99. See Edwards & Hanley v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 484 (2d
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980).
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to aid and abet the borrower's fraud. In short, by classifying the bank's role
as inaction, and therefore imposing upon the investors the unenviably tough
burden of proving that the bank intended to facilitate its borrower's fraud,
the Metge court may well have decided the outcome of the case when an
alternative classification, accompanied by the investors' correspondingly
lower burden of proving the bank's mere recklessness, appeared just as
plausible.
Brennan v. Midwestern Life Insurance Co. 100 further exemplifies the futil-
ity of attempting to make a workable distinction between action and inac-
tion. The facts in Brennan indicated that the defendant, Midwestern, failed
to inform the state securities board about a fraud that a broker was perpe-
trating against Midwestern shareholders. The defendant's failure to disclose
the broker's fraud to its shareholders clearly constituted inaction. While de-
ciding that silence may under certain circumstances, constitute substantial
assistance,10' the Brennan court avoided the complications associated with
adjudicating an inaction case by emphasizing the fact that Midwestern re-
ferred its shareholders who complained of the broker's conduct directly to
the broker himself.102 Midwestern's referrals of its stockholders to the bro-
ker were sporadic, however, and appeared relatively insignificant when com-
pared to the defendant's prolonged silence.'0 3
If inaction can constitute assistance, then a court may routinely hold a
lender liable as an aider and abettor for its mere nondisclosure of informa-
tion. Such a rule of law could devastate the commercial banking industry.' 04
Although lenders usually possess an in-depth knowledge of their borrowers'
financial position, a lender's use of the information would not regularly ex-
pose a borrower's rule lOb-5 violation.
Several facts may explain why courts have not expanded the judicially
created aider and abettor doctrine to cover situations involving inaction.
First, the language of rule lOb-5 supports the conclusion that neither inac-
100. 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
101. 417 F.2d at 154.
102. Id. (characterizing Midwestern's participation as "affirmative conduct").
103. A number of courts have rejected the Brennan court's classification of Midwestern's
assistance as affirmative action. See IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 927 (2d Cir. 1980) ("the
'affirmative action' [in Brennan] was slight indeed"); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880,
889 (3d Cir. 1975) (referring to Brennan as an inaction case).
104. Courts hold that, especially when the accused aider and abettor merely performs com-
mercial ministerial tasks, imposing liability without proof that the defendant intended the task
he performed to further the fraud would be unjust. See Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d at
97; Wright v. Schock, 571 F. Supp. 642, 663 (N.D. Cal. 1983); Feldman v. Simkins Indus.,
Inc., 492 F. Supp. 839, 847 (N.D. Cal. 1980), afl'd, 679 F.2d 1299 (9th Cir. 1982). According
to one court, "Knowledge of the underlying violation is a critical element in the proof of aiding-
abetting liability, for without this requirement financial institutions.., would be virtual insur-
ers of their customers against securities law violations." Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef
Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978); see also
SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1317 (6th Cir. 1974) (where only silence is alleged, too low
standard of proof creates a risk of imposing liability upon innocent parties), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 908 (1975). At a minimum, adopting such a policy would drastically increase the costs
associated with obtaining financing. Comment, Lender Liability for Security Law Violations of
Its Borrowers, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 113, 136-42 (1985).
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tion nor silence constitutes assistance. Rule lOb-5, subpart (b) explicitly pro-
hibits silence under certain circumstances. 10 5 According to rule lOb-5,
however, before such silence violates rule lOb-5 the person must have previ-
ously made an affirmative statement that subsequent silence makes mislead-
ing. 10 6 For example, a securities dealer may well violate rule 1Ob-5 when he
emphasizes the recent profitability of an issuer without also disclosing that
the issuer's recent change in inventory valuation methods is at least partially
responsible for the attractive results. In other words, rule lOb-5 condemns
silence only when it makes a prior affirmative statement misleading.1 0 7 Con-
sequently, even if a lender actually possesses knowledge of a borrower's
fraudulent acts and opts not to inform the victim, the lender's silence is inac-
tion under rule lOb-5 and accordingly cannot constitute substantial
assistance.
Classifying silence or inaction as assistance appears inconsistent with the
law underlying aider and abettor liability. Although some forms of aider
and abettor liability have been codified, courts originally created the doctrine
by analogizing to common law tort and criminal law notions,I0 8 neither of
which impose liability for nonfeasance.' 0 9 Consequently, courts cannot im-
pose liability upon lenders for mere inaction without deviating from those
principles that purport to support the doctrine.
The Woodward court indicated that the implied cause of action under rule
lOb-5 is already overextended and that to expand aider and abettor liability
further, to routinely encompass secondary parties, would be inequitable. 1 0
105. Securities Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1986) makes it
unlawful to "omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading .... (Emphasis
added.)
106. Id.
107. See Rudolph v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F.2d 1040, 1043-44 (lth Cir. 1986)
(citing First Va. Bankshares, 800 F.2d at 1314) (accountant may be subject to duty to disclose
ordinary business information pursuant to rule lob-5 when silence makes a previous report
misleading or incorrect); First Va. Bankshares v. Benson, 559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977)
(rule lob-5 only prohibits silence when silence makes prior voluntary statement misleading),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978); Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279, 284 (9th Cir. 1971) (the only
silence rule lob-5 condemns is that making a prior affirmative statement misleading).
108. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. at 680.
109. See Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343, 346 (1959); RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
supra note 33, § 314; see also M. BASSIONNI, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 2.2.2 (1978)
(absent a statutory or common law duty, there is no criminal liability for mere inaction); 1 W.
BURDWICK, THE LAW OF CRIMES § 109 (1946) (same); W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HAND-
BOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 26 (1972) (same); J. TURNER, RUSSEL ON CRIME 402 (1964)
(same).
110. Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d at 84. Prior to conceding that Congress probably
never intended civil aider and abettor liability to arise from § 10(b), the Woodward court noted
that: "[tihe very breadth of present lOb-5 law imposes a duty on the courts to evaluate a
proposed expansion of the Rule's coverage in light of the facts and circumstances of the new
case." Id. at 90. Furthermore, the court disposed of the case without recognizing the exist-
ence of rule lOb-5 aiding and abetting liability. Rather, the court held that, if such an action
existed, the plaintiff had not carried its burden of proof. Id. at 94-95 n.22; accord Wessel v.
Buhler, 437 F.2d 279, 283 (9th Cir. 1971) ("exposure of independent accountants and others to
such vistas of liability [as created by imposing aider and abettor liability on a mere commercial
transactions absent a duty], limited only by the ingenuity of investors and their counsel, would
lead to serious mischief").
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Consequently, the Woodward court limited a secondary party's liability for
inaction to occasions when the secondary party possessed the highest variety
of intent to participate in the fraud."' Thus, neither rule lOb-5 nor the
implied liability thereunder imposes a duty to act when no duty previously
existed. Such a result is justified, according to the Woodward court, because
"Rule lOb-5 was not designed to be an ethical Ten Commandments for all
securities transactions."' 12
Mostly, courts follow Woodward and hence refuse to impose aiding and
abetting liability for failure to act, absent a preexisting legal duty to act or a
high degree of conscious intent to perpetrate a fraud.1 3 This being the case,
existing tort principles provide a more equitable framework for adjudicating
cases involving fraudulent inaction. If a lender's nondisclosure is actionable
because the lender owed the victim a duty of disclosure, courts should base
liability on the lender's breach of that duty, rather than on a statutory extra-
polation of rule lOb-5. Further, if the lender intentionally fails to act in
order to further the fraud, courts may then impose liability on the lender as
a principal under theories of conspiracy or agency." 14
b. Loans as Assistance
Is a lending institution's loan to a borrower affirmative conduct such that
a court can hold that the lender assisted in the fraud that the borrower un-
dertook with the proceeds? Courts have exhibited a willingness to find an
affirmative undertaking even when the secondary party's action appeared in-
consequential in comparison to its failure to act.11 5 The courts' propensity
for finding action on questionable facts has produced an inconsistent body of
case law in which fact finders have free rein to justify their sympathetic reac-
tions with a finding of assistance through active conduct.
A landmark case on the issue of whether loans constitute inaction is
Woodward v. Metro Bank. 1 6 In Woodward the evidence indicated that the
bank's involvement with the defrauder consisted of lending him money in
the ordinary course of business and failing to discover and disclose the de-
frauder's scheme. The court held that the bank's loan constituted only inac-
tion and, therefore, would not support aider and abettor liability. 1 7 In
111. Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d at 95.
112. Id. at 87.
113. Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985); IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909,
925 (2d Cir. 1980); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d at 95.
114. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974); Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380
F.2d 262, 267 n.2 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967). See generally Gilmore & Mc-
Bride, supra note 54, at 813-16 (discusses various theories upon which aiders and abettors may
be held as principals); Ruder, supra note 4, at 645-49 (discusses how many failed aiding and
abetting actions involve direct duties and may therefore be brought directly on theories of
conspiracy or agency).
115. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
116. 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975).
117. Id. at 95; see also Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985) (unless the aider
and abettor owes the plaintiff an affirmative duty to disclose information, inaction cannot pro-
vide an adequate basis for liability under the substantial assistance analysis).
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Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 118 however, and in at least one
subsequent decision, courts have treated a lender's extension of credit as an
affirmative act tantamount to assistance. 1 9 The Monsen court's cursory
analysis exemplifies the outcome-oriented nature of these decisions. The
Monsen opinion fails to address the underlying policies of aider and abettor
liability that should be dispositive of the issue.
Commentators who contend that extending loans in the ordinary course
of business, and for legitimate business purposes, can constitute assistance
argue that such a classification will further rule lOb-5's goal of protecting
investors.' 20 This result is axiomatic. Lenders exposed to potential liability
for making loans will of course require potential borrowers to provide more
financial information pursuant to each loan and will scrutinize each bor-
rower's business operations more carefully. Such a policy will in effect trans-
form individual lenders into private regulatory agencies. Stepped-up loan
approval procedures will reduce the number of frauds perpetrated with
loaned funds at the expense of increased transaction costs in a market whose
efficiency is essential to the economic well-being of industry and personal
finance. Such an effect contravenes Congress's goals of providing for open
securities markets without interfering with commercial efficiency.21 What
is more, the Supreme Court has rejected this private enforcement rationale
for creating additional implied causes of actions for securities fraud.' 22
c. Problems of Causation
General principles of causation offer the most persuasive ground for refus-
ing to extend the current framework of aider and abettor liability to lenders.
If courts nevertheless do elect to apply the three-pronged test for aider and
abettor liability to lenders, the substantial assistance requirement should im-
port fundamental tort notions of causation. 123 A causation requirement
would guarantee that courts will not routinely burden lenders with the un-
118. 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978).
119. Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 484 (2d Cir.
1979) (court perceives extension of loan as action).
120. Comment, supra note 3, at 241 (arguing that courts should establish a uniform thresh-
old of recklessness for two reasons: (1) recklessness threshold would eliminate the dilemma
between action and inaction, and (2) the Supreme Court in Hochfelder slighted the importance
of the distinction between primary and secondary liability, thereby indicating that the scienter
requirement for each is identical). See generally Note, Liability for Aiding and Abetting Viola-
tions of Rule lOb-5." Recklessness Standard in Civil Damage Actions, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1087(1985) (arguing that the policies underlying securities law would best be served if courts re-
solved the existing controversy by adopting a recklessness standard).
121. For a discussion of the companion purposes of the Securities Exchange Act, see supra
note 58.
122. Jackson Transit Auth. v. Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15, 24 (1981) (legislative history
provides conclusive indication of whether a statute creates a cause of action); Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 69 (1975) (congressional intention discerned through statutory interpretation, and not
a judicial policy of enforcement enhancement, must determine the existence and scope of any
course of action).
123. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 48 (2d Cir. 1978) (treating causa-
tion as indication of substantiality of assistance), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978). See gener-
ally Comment, supra note 3, at 236-38 (arguing that a substantial factor test emphasizes
causation should replace the current rule lOb-5 aider and abettor framework).
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warranted imposition of aider and abettor liability as plaintiffs bring actions
based upon more intricate and remote relationships. 124 For example, in a
situation in which a defrauder uses loan proceeds to purchase stock in a
fraudulent scheme, the lender's extension of credit arguably constitutes a
cause in fact or "but for" cause, of the victim's losses. 125 One can say the
same for a lender who fails to discover its borrower's fraud based upon the
information in the lender's possession.
Courts increasingly emphasize the causal element of the aider and abettor
doctrine in order to protect secondary parties from inequitable judgments. 126
Some courts have even required a higher degree of causation akin to proxi-
mate cause. 127 The tort law heritage of aider and abettor liability justifies
this heightened causal relation requirement. 128 Commentators have even
suggested that causation is the touchstone of the aider and abettor issue and,
therefore, have advocated the abandonment of the current three-pronged
analysis in favor of a substantial factor inquiry. 129 Under general principles
of proximate causation a lender never assists its borrower's fraud by ex-
tending credit to the borrower in the ordinary course of business and for
ostensibly legal purposes. In such a case the lender's inaction cannot be the
legal cause of the injury that its borrower inflicts upon the victim. If consid-
ered in the context of tort law causation, the relationship between a party
who regularly lends funds and a party who borrows funds and uses them for
an improper purpose is simply too tenuous to justify joint and several liabil-
ity upon the lender. 130 In tort law terms, the criminal intent of the borrower
is a supervening cause that the law deems solely responsible for the victim's
124. Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 484 (2d Cir.
1979) (lender who provides loans to finance a defrauder's short selling scheme was the "but
for," but not the proximate cause of the victims' losses), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980); see
F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 20 (1981); C. MORRIS, TORTS 154-
59 (2d ed. 1980); W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, TORTS § 41 (5th ed. 1984).
125. Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 624 (8th Cir. 1985); lIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909,
925-26 (2d Cir. 1980) (aider and abettor's assistance must have caused the victim's loss); Ed-
wards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp, 602 F.2d 478, 484 (2d Cir. 1979).
126. Baker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 787 F.2d 490, 495-96 (7th Cir. 1986);
Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 624 (8th Cir. 1985); Hokana v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F.
Supp. 636, 641 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Hudson v. Capital Management Int'l, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 615,
622-23 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
127. Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 484 (2d Cir.
1979).
128. See W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, supra note 124, §§ 43-44; Comment, supra note 3, at
253 ("the trier of fact [should] assess the causal significance of each defendant's conduct; the
court cannot ignore the causation question by simply linking the defendant's conduct to a
larger scheme").
129. See Comment, supra note 3, at 248-54.
130. In Mendelsohn v. Capital Underwriters, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1069, 1084 (N.D. Cal.
1979), the court indicated that the alleged aider and abettor did not cause the underlying
securities law violation because if it had quit the defrauder's service upon learning of the de-
frauder's activity, the defrauder would "simply have hired a less astute accountant." Further,
although the court did not specifically call it a superseding cause, it held that the defrauder's
fraudulent use of the alleged aider and abettor services, and not the services themselves, ef-
fected a fraud upon the victims. Id. at 1086. In Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clear-
ance Corp., 602 F.2d at 485, the court generalized that, "if a bank lends money to a customer





III. REMEDYING THE AIDER AND ABETTOR DOCTRINE: THE ACTUAL
KNOWLEDGE STANDARD
Courts have over-expanded rule lOb-5. The rule's legislative history does
not warrant even the recognition of a civil cause of action against primary
perpetrators of a rule lOb-5 violation. Nevertheless courts have gone so far
as to create a cause of action against parties peripheral to the violation.' 32
Furthermore, courts have implied the existence of a civil cause of action
against secondary parties by analogizing to tort theory. 133 The Supreme
Court, however, has recently rejected tort as the basis for implying other
civil actions arising from violations of securities laws.1 34 What is more, re-
cent Supreme Court decisions indicate a trend toward restricting the expan-
sion of liability under the Act and interpreting it according to conservative
rules of construction. ' 35
One should conclude from the foregoing discussion that if courts do not
cut back on existing aider and abettor liability they should at least limit their
expansion of the doctrine by requiring plaintiffs to prove that any secondary
parties accused of aiding and abetting a rule lOb-5 violation acted with ac-
tual knowledge in promoting the fraud. The argument for limited expansion
follows because a court's application of the aider and abettor doctrine re-
lieves the plaintiff of proving the elements of common law fraud or a rule
lOb-5 violation, and hence emasculates the projections normally afforded a
defendant in those actions. As the relationship between the victim and the
accused aider and abettor become more remote, the risk of inequitable deci-
sions increases. Courts should adjust the knowledge requirement
accordingly.
A. Legislative Intent
The legislative history of section 10(b) clearly indicates that Congress in-
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 33, § 440 defines a superseding cause as "an act
of a third person or other force which by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable
for harm to another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about."
Furthermore, the comments to § 440 provide that:
if in looking back from the harm and tracing the sequence of events by which it
was produced, it is found that a superseding cause has operated, there is no need
of determining whether the actor's antecedent conduct was or was not a substan-
tial factor in bring about the harm.
Id. § 440 comment b (emphasis added); accord H. HART & A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE
LAW 129 (1962).
132. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 35.
134. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
135. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577-78 (1979) (Congress's failure
to provide for explicit secondary liability in § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1982), should be construed as affirmatively denying liability similar to that
found under § 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11,
14 (1979) (broad proscription of fraudulent practices by investment advisors under § 206 of
the Investment Advisors Act does not create or alter civil liability; courts must construe reme-
dies available under statutes narrowly).
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tended it as a regulatory provision. 136 Courts have created the existing civil
remedies under the section. 137 Courts now wrestling with the aider and abet-
tor knowledge requirement might consider the degree to which the section's
legislative history does or does not support the aider and abettor cause of
action.
The Securities Acts contain provisions that expressly impose civil liability
on secondary parties.13 Notably, in each provision in which Congress has
provided for civil liability, Congress also has protected the rights of potential
defendants by establishing explicit limitations on the actions and by enumer-
ating adequate defenses.139 Thus, the statutory structure of the Acts' liabil-
ity provisions demonstrates that Congress has explicitly provided for liability
in those instances deemed appropriate. Courts should interpret section
10(b)'s silence on secondary liability as Congress's affirmative decision to
withhold liability on the defrauder's remote cohorts. 14°
The legislative history of section 10(b) provides further indication that
Congress consciously restricted the section's scope to the actual defrauder.
On several occasions, Congress has refused to amend the section to bring
aiders and abettors expressly within its scope.14' Thus, from a strictly inter-
pretive perspective, section 10(b)'s drafters never intended it to accommo-
date aiders and abettors.
B. Supreme Court Mandate of Constriction
Courts founded their early decisions recognizing civil liability for aiding
and abetting based on a rule lOb-5 violation on the tort theory that the Acts
136. For a discussion of the legislative history of § 10(b), see supra note 11 and accompany-
ing text.
137. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
138. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20, 15 U.S.C § 78t (1982 & Supp. III 1985)
(imposing liability upon controlling persons); Securities Act of 1933, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o
(1982) (controlling persons); Id. § 11, 15 U.S.C § 77k (1982) (parties responsible for incorrect
registration statements).
Securities Act of 1933, § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982), illustrates Congress's ability to
define a specific civil remedy. Section 12(2) provides that any person who is defrauded in any
transaction related to the transfer of a security "may sue ... to recover the consideration paid
for such security with interest thereon ...or for damages ...." 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1982).
139. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1934), reprinted in 2 J. ELLENBERGER & E.
MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 & THE SECURITIES Ex-
CHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 455 (1973) (setting out a short statute of limitations on each private
cause of action expressly provided for).
140. Transameria Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 14 (1979); Touche Ross
& Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 572-73 (1979) (the presence of explicit private remedies in
the act affirmatively negates any congressional intent to imply additional remedies); Cannon v.
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1972); see also Fischel, Secondary Liability Under
Section lOb of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 80, 96-99 (1981) (arguing that the
act's framework negates additional species of aiding and abetting).
141. Hearings Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 93, 103 (1959) (as cited in Fischel, supra note 140, at 98 n.103); see Iroquois
Indus. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963, 966 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding that the meaning of
a legislative enactment unbroken by its drafters since its passage should only be altered by
congressional action); Gilmore & McBride, supra note 54, at 817 (arguing that Congress's




created private rights, the violation of which justified private remedies. 142
The Supreme Court, however, has now discredited the courts' practice of
exploiting tort law to imply private remedies based upon the violation of a
regulatory provision. 143 For example, in refusing to recognize a private
cause of action for a violation of section 17(e) of the 1934 Act, the Court
asserted that a private action only arises if congressional intent, as ascer-
tained through conventional statutory interpretation, mandates recognition
of such action. 44 One can fairly interpret the Supreme Court's recent in-
struction, therefore, to mean that the relevant inquiry is not whether an im-
plied private action will help protect investors, but rather, whether Congress
intended to create such an action.
The courts' creation of the rule lOb-5 action, as it now exists, is the result
of courts' ignoring the plain import of the rule's regulatory genesis in order
to further what they construed to be the rule's underlying purpose. Such
actions conflict with the Supreme Court's mandate against supplementing
statutory remedies with newly created private remedies. 145 The early deci-
sions recognizing civil liability for a violation of rule lOb-5 failed to cite any
supportive legislative history for their holdings.146 Subsequent decisions af-
firming and expanding the implied cause of action substituted precedent for
statutory support and rationalized their holdings by expounding sweeping
generalizations concerning the welfare of investors. The Supreme Court's
failure to ratify a private cause of action under rule lOb-5, even when given
the opportunity, demonstrates the lack of substantive support for the courts'
expansion of rule lOb-5.1 47 Realistically, the Supreme Court is now unlikely
to refuse to defer to the mass of precedent supporting the existence of a
private right of action under rule lOb-5 generally and the aider and abettor
doctrine specifically. The Court would do well, however, to consider the
absence of traditional legal justifications for the aider and abettor doctrine
and to limit its scope by defining its scienter element as actual knowledge.
C. Availability of More Equitable Remedies
Since other remedies exist that allow plaintiffs to vindicate their rights
without compromising either the common law or the statutory protections
those areas of law afford defendants, courts should require plaintiffs choos-
ing to bring a private cause of action based on the rule lOb-5 aider and abet-
142. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964) (Court justified private action because
it created an additional deterrent effect); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512,
514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (court expressly ignored statutory interpretation and utilized tort
principles).
143. See supra note 135.
144. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979).
145. Id.
146. See SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1319 (6th Cir. 1974); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d
139, 156-59 (3d Cir. 1973); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680
(N.D. Ind. 1966), affid, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969).
147. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976). Since the Court in
Hochfelder treated the alleged aider and abettor as a principal rather than as an aider and
abettor, one commentator argues that the Supreme Court has already implicitly rejected the
potential for aiding and abetting liability under rule 10b-5. Fischel, supra note 140, at 76.
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tor doctrine to prove that the secondary party furthered the primary party's
fraud with actual knowledge of the fraud's existence. Any doctrine imposing
liability on lenders as aiders and abettors arises as a product of judicial ex-
pansion without legislative support, and courts should view it critically.
Courts should be especially wary about expanding implied causes of action
in the aider and abettor area since other more conventional causes of action
are available to protect the rights of investors.
Prior to Congress's enactment of section 10(b), authorizing the SEC to
draft rule lOb-5, several remedies for fraud in the market place existed. 148
Unfortunately, the inconvenience and complexity of these actions detracted
from their attractiveness to plaintiffs. For example, to recover against a sec-
ondary party for fraud, a plaintiff must prove that the party engaged in in-
tentionally misleading conduct, that it had the intent to perpetrate a fraud,
that the plaintiff acted in reasonable reliance, and that the defendant's con-
duct caused the plaintiff's damages.1 49 The elements of a fraud evolved
through thousands of judicial decisions. In the area of common law fraud,
intense judicial scrutiny has balanced the need to compensate victims against
the need to protect defendants who are remotely related to the fraud and are
not really responsible for the victim's injuries. 150 Elements such as reliance
and causation, which the aider and abettor doctrine substantially discards
with respect to secondary parties, reduce the risks that a run-of-the-mill
transaction, such as making a commercial loan in the ordinary course of
business, will entangle the actor in another party's fraud. In fairness, courts
should allow these same protections, or their functional equivalents, to de-
fendants in implied actions under federal securities law.
In promulgating the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Congress supplemented investors' existing common law reme-
dies with well-defined, less cumbersome, 15 1 statutory actions. Through sec-
tion 12(2) of the 1933 Act, Congress provided investors an explicit civil
remedy against sellers employing fraudulent sales schemes.1 52 In section I 1
of the 1933 Act 5 3 Congress provided a civil cause of action, including sec-
ondary liability, against sellers filing false registration statements pursuant to
148. The most obvious remedy for a defrauded investor is an action for common law de-
ceit. See generally Ruder, supra note 4, at 601-46 (outlining the alternative remedies available
to a defrauded investor under common law including fraud, agency, and conspiracy).
149. Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1214, reh'g denied, 701 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 920 (1983); Chemetron Corp. v. Business Fund, Inc., 682 F.2d 1149,
1171, reh'g denied, 689 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated, 460 U.S. 1007, cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1013 (1983); Stone v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 554 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. 1977). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 33, § 525.
150. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 536-41 (2d ed. 1955) (discuss-
ing how courts developed the basis of responsibility in fraud based upon culpability and ex-
plaining how scienter requirement serves this purpose).
151. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (rule lOb-5 does not
require the same degree of reliance on a misstatement as fraud does); White v. Abrams, 495
F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1974) (plaintiffs need not go through the rigors of pleading and proving
fraud under rule lOb-5 because trend has been for courts to eliminate common law obstacles to
recovery).
152. Securities Exchange Act of 1933, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
153. Id. § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982).
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section 11.154 Further, in section 15 of the 1933 Act, Congress unequivocally
created civil liability against controlling persons.155 Thus, if a lender exerts
financial pressure to coerce a borrower into violating federal securities law,
Congress has already granted the victim a remedy against the lender. The
Acts' civil remedy provisions indicate, however, that when Congress statuto-
rily provided more streamlined federal securities fraud actions to supplement
those cumbersome remedies available to defrauded investors at common
law, Congress did not intend to eliminate all equitable safeguards that the
rigorous common law elements provided. In each instance in which Con-
gress has granted investors a simplified federal securities fraud action it has
also compensated potential defendants for the lack of traditional safeguards
by enumerating special defenses, granting short limitations periods, and lim-
iting secondary parties' liability. 156
When courts recognized the aider and abettor doctrine's applicability
under rule lOb-5, they further streamlined Congress's already liberal statu-
tory scheme by removing from plaintiffs the necessity of proving many, if
not all, of the elements of a primary lOb-5 violation. If an investor brings
suit against a lender as a secondary party for common law deceit based on a
lender's nondisclosure of information regarding its borrower's fraud, the in-
vestor would have to prove all of the elements of a fraud against the
lender.'5 7 If, however, the same investor brings an action against the lender
for aiding and abetting its borrower's rule lOb-5 violation, the investor need
only provide evidence of the lender's disregard of the risk that its silence
would aid its borrower's fraud.' 58 If the plaintiff succeeds in shedding any
doubt on the lender's mental state, then the lender's nondisclosure appears
colored with fraud. Further, since many perceive lenders as deep pockets, a
jury may be inclined to label the lender's nondisclosure as substantial assist-
ance regardless of whether the lender was aware of the significance of this
nondisclosure of information. Irrespective of the courts' definition of scienter
in aider and abettor actions, the aider and abettor doctrine provides signifi-
cantly fewer checks on a jury's discretion, and therefore, affords defendants
fewer safeguards against unsupported jury verdicts then its common law and
statutory counterparts.
Although banks do not normally review loan applications with an eye to-
ward fraud, because they do possess a great deal of financial information on
their borrowers, they find themselves in a particulary sensitive position
should one of their borrowers' commit a fraud against investors. Because a
rule lOb-5 aider and abettor action circumvents many of the procedural safe-
guards existing in more well-defined actions, courts should consider counter-
balancing the rights of defendants by defining the required scienter as actual
knowledge. Such a rigorous scienter standard would reduce the current dis-
parity between the proof that courts require for the plaintiff to recover under
154. Id.
155. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77f (1982).
156. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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other common law or statutory remedies and the proof that courts currently
require under the aider and abettor doctrine. Plaintiffs may still recover
from secondary parties through alternative actions that better protect re-
mote defendants by tempering plaintiffs' sometimes unwarranted zeal with
the added burden of proving more comprehensive common law or statutory
elements.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court has reserved judgment on the issue, aiding
and abetting liability in federal securities law is now an undeniable fact. The
unsolved issue is to what extent courts will expand or restrict the doctrine's
application to more tenuous relationships by defining the defendant's action-
able mental state as either knowledge or some lesser state of mind. As plain-
tiffs urge courts to expand the doctrine to allow actions against secondary
parties based upon the inferences that jurors may draw from legitimate com-
mercial relationships, the precise requisite culpability that courts require
before allowing recovery becomes critical. A standard that is too low will
undoubtedly impose liability when it is not warranted and will, therefore,
discourage legitimate productive relationships.
Before expanding the aider and abettor doctrine to burden lenders rou-
tinely for the acts of their borrowers by adopting a recklessness standard of
culpability, courts should take notice of the action's unconventional evolu-
tion and the Supreme Court's recent mandates against implying extra statu-
tory remedies. Such an inquiry produces the following conclusions: first,
Congress did not intend section 10(b) to become the genesis of civil liability,
much less of aider and abettor liability; second, since tort notions form the
basis of the rule lOb-5 aider and abettor doctrine, and since the Supreme
Court has discredited such an analogy, the doctrine now has no support;
third, the Supreme Court has stated that courts should not imply remedies
from statutory provisions when alternative, more equitable, remedies are
available. In the case of aider and abettor liability for lenders, the plaintiff
has many alternative remedies that may vindicate his rights. These reme-
dies, although more complex, are better designed to accommodate remote or
tenuous relationships without creating harsh inequities. If, however, a plain-
tiff insists on bringing an aider and abettor action based on rule lOb-5, courts
should require the plaintiff to prove that the lender involved acted as it did
with actual knowledge of its borrower's rule lOb-5 violation.
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